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1 A  number  of  trends  may  be  observed  in  contemporary  work  on  rhetoric  and
argumentation.  Some  of  this  work  analyses  the  correct  way  to  conduct  a  debate,
starting out from an idealised model comprising a set of rules which participants would
be required to  observe.  We can see here the inspiration from the English-speaking
world, of which the Amsterdam school is currently one of the main representatives.
The first work in French by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1996) is indeed
significantly entitled La nouvelle dialectique (English title: Fundamentals of Argumentation
Theory), thereby emphasising the authors’ desire to distance themselves from an overly
dangerous rhetorical option, as called for in 1958 by Chaïm Perelman in La nouvelle
rhétorique (English title: The New Rhetoric: Treatise on Argumentation). The option from the
English-speaking world taken up by the Amsterdam school is frequently criticised for
excessive normativity compared with an option making a greater effort to describe the
real productions of speakers, with no prejudices regarding the fallacious or “correct”
nature of the productions. The descriptive approach is preferred in work on rhetoric
and  argumentation  in  French1.  The  Brussels  school  for  its  part  –  still  inspired  by
Perelman – is currently attempting to revive the traditional studies of argumentation
inspired by philosophy and law by adopting the descriptivist approach inherited from
the linguistic tradition. This theoretical attitude thus takes up the three-fold challenge
of  considering the argumentative phenomena according to  an approach that  by its
nature  is  interdisciplinary  –  involving  linguistics,  law,  literature,  philosophy  and
psychology  –  but  at  the  same  time  taking  care  to  apply  a  process  that  is  more
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descriptive than normative, and at the same time trying to enlighten analysis of the
discourse by a more general questioning of the argumentative function as a tool for
human rationality2. It is thus the ambition of this volume to report on the notion of
crisis in democracy, by using rhetorical reflection.
2 It is said that crises are often the origin of changes in paradigm. In a sense, they are the
manifestation  of  a  passage  or  transformation  from  one  state  to  another.  It  is
nevertheless  necessary  to  state  what  we mean here  by  “paradigm”.  As  a  means  of
understanding reality,  this notion supposes not only a set of representations of the
world, but also a certain conception of knowledge. All in all, it is a way of thinking, or a
“mentality”  in  the  deliberately  critical  sense  in  which it  is  used by  Geoffrey  Lloyd
(1993). The critical dimension is particularly pertinent for the approach adopted here,
as it makes it possible to conceive the rhetorical model as a paradigm while assuming
the limits of that conception. We shall see subsequently that this critical dimension will
serve as a direction for consideration in investigating the notion of crisis in
democracy3.
3 Rhetoric,  based  on  the  canons  of  logic,  nevertheless  needs to  be  persuasive.  For
Aristotle, the discipline deals with what is true, useful, beautiful, and their opposites.
Regarding these  subjects,  humans  gathered  together  are  supposed  to  formulate
judgments that in turn are supposed to lead to decisions. Thus within the paradigm –
that of modern logic – people argue with a view to reaching decisions, but the discourse
still needs to be persuasive. Has that always been the case, right from the origin of
rhetoric?
4 In  fact,  rhetoric  has  evolved considerably  since  Aristotle’s  day,  doubtless  on all  its
essential points – the object of its judgments, the conception of its proof, both technical
and extra-technical – and the division of its genres. And yet, beyond this evolution, the
rhetorical  paradigm remains essentially unchanged. This art  of  persuasion makes it
possible to represent the world and to make judgments and decisions. The ultimate aim
of  these  various  functions  is  to  improve  the  living  conditions  of  the  community
practising them. Seen in this light, exploring the notion of crisis from the viewpoint of
rhetoric can enrich our thinking on the evolution of both societies and their ways of
thinking. The ambition of this presentation will be to contribute to consideration of the
notion of “crisis”, considered from the viewpoint of relations between democracy and
rhetoric.
5 Like many other concepts essential to understanding social reality, the notion of crisis
has a history that may cursorily be traced by its lexical uses. Etymologically, it is firstly
the  manifestation of  an  observable  change,  becoming subsequently  the  judgment  –
krisis – on some matter giving rise to a decision. In this active, human conception of
crisis, it is human action that gives rise to a change in the world, and humans assume
their responsibility for it.
6 Thus we may think of the “judgment” of rhetoric,  as contained in the “critique” of
opinions, as the ritualisation of an abstract, blind crisis, originally the manifestation of
a  sudden  change.  Considering  the  rhetorical  framework  in  its  anthropological  and
linguistic function as humanity’s effort to appropriate a part of what had previously
escaped it makes it possible to throw light on these two aspects of crisis: from being
distressing because of its nature as a sign of change, it becomes action and deliberation
rhetorically  speaking,  and hence  an area  of  freedom.  This  appropriation of  change
takes place as a result of the effect of a ritualisation which makes it possible, here as
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elsewhere, to accompany the action. The first stage in this appropriation must involve
a  representation  of  the  event.  This  means  stating  the  problem  and  describing  the
situation by means of an account expressed publicly and shared by the community.
Representation is therefore a condition of judgment, since it is what the judgment is
based on. It is also, however, a cognitive act that places the event at a distance.
7 In  both  political  and  legal  rhetoric,  renouncing  the  event  to  be  judged  is  a  stage,
essential  in  itself,  during  which  judgment  is  suspended.  Who  knows  whether
everything will fall into place and return to normal, or whether on the contrary the
community will undergo radical change once deliberation is complete? At any event,
once judgment is delivered, order will be re-established – whether that order is new or
old will depend on what has been decided by the group.
8 However,  this  idealised  description  of  the  system  of  rhetoric  –  representation,
judgment, decision – would only be realistic in a disembodied conception of rhetoric.
This is no doubt the ideal to which Plato aspired. However, since the time of Aristotle, it
has generally been admitted that rhetoric is also a matter of emotions, testing, errors,
doubts,  and revisions.  Thus each representation,  each judgment,  each decision may
give rise to doubts or even serious disagreements. Rhetoric is indeed a human affair.
Nevertheless, there are moments when the rhetorical system as a tool for regulating
crises may itself be the subject of crisis, either because it appears to have lost its ability
to represent the events, or because the means used to establish a judgment appear to
be inappropriate, or because the methods leading to the decision are not acknowledged
by the community4.
9 In those societies that claim to be democratic, the system of rhetoric is the preferred
tool  for  decision-making,  even though it  is  at  the  same time the  subject  of  doubt,
suspicion,  and  even  on  occasions  downright  distrust.  It  is  this  link  between  the
rhetorical function and the use made of it in a democracy that needs to be observed,
analysed, and understood. Is it possible to establish a link between crises in rhetoric
and crises in democracy? Is the system of rhetoric endangered when society has to face
an intense political crisis? Or is it the inability of the system of rhetoric, in certain
cases, to assume its role of representation and judgment that leads to a political crisis?
Seen in this light, the tool for thinking about society and making it take action becomes
defective. How then can the crisis be faced other than by taking the full brunt of it?
10 Each of the authors who took part in this questioning dealt with one of the aspects of
the crisis, emphasising either the representation, the judgment, or the decision aspect.
Each considered the question from his/her own standpoint, yet actively embracing the
proposed  interdisciplinary  approach.  It  is  therefore  more  particularly  these  three
aspects  of  representation,  judgment  and  decision  which  will  be  discussed  here,  in
considering rhetoric in a crisis situation.5
 
Is there a crisis in representation?
11 Is rhetoric able to represent? What happens to representation in a time of crisis? These
are two questions addressed by Christian Biet, who compares the representation of the
events which marked the Wars of Religion in the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe on
the one hand, and the Second World War on the other. The author’s first question is at
the heart of the issue regarding representation. In both cases, society, after events of
unheard-of violence had taken place, found itself faced with a question of a political
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order  –  “Should  catastrophe be  represented?”  An  essential  source  of  reflection  is
contained  in  the  diametrically  opposite  responses  made  by  society  in  these  two
instances regarding the issue of representation. On the one hand there is the duty to
forget, included in the actual wording of the Edict of Nantes, and on the other there is
the duty to remember, a duty well known to our contemporaries. These two options
gave  rise  to  differing  treatment  of  representation  by  the  society  of  the  time.  The
political ban contained in the duty to forget conditions indirect representations which
make it possible to consider the event by analogy with another event to which no such
ban  applies.  In  the  second  case,  the  duty  to  remember  confers  the  weight  of  the
ineffable  on  the  event,  which  will  find  an  escape  route  by  aestheticising  the
representation. Christian Biet, who is a specialist in the representation of violence in
the theatre, notes with great acuity that in the contemporary theatre representation
has  become  auto-representation,  which  means  that  theatrical  action  stages  the
impossibility of representation6.
12 Whether  it  is  forbidden  or  ineffable,  representation  is  therefore  not  direct.
Nevertheless, every society circumvents the bans placed on it, making no reference to
the event when there is a duty to forget, and referring to the event when there is a duty
to  remember.  These  two  types  of  circumvention  give  rise  to  radically  different
rhetorical options, however. The result is that a ban produces indirect representation,
through  mediation,  while  an  obligation  prevents  representation,  blocking  it  and
turning  it  against  itself.  Mediation,  the  symbolisation  of  the  world  in  words,  is,
however, at the very heart of rhetoric. Christian Biet’s reflections lead to a paradox
that  is  strange  for  the  rhetorical  system.  Would  banning  expression  paradoxically
promote the freedom to represent, by the need to circumvent it? Is the Edict of Nantes
more “rhetorically correct” than the highly contemporary “duty of memory”? We can
see that, behind the rhetorical question, there is an unresolved political question. Is
there some escape route that contemporary rhetoric could take to avoid the risk of the
ineffable?
13 That is what is proposed by Yannis Thanassekos, Director of the Auschwitz Foundation
in Brussels, which has been able to gather and conserve a large number of first-hand
accounts from people who escaped the Shoah. His contribution is in line with Christian
Biet’s thinking, addressing the question of the representation of catastrophe in modern
times.  To  do  so,  Yannis  Thanassekos  recalls  that  the  ultimate  representation  was
formulated by Jacques Derrida (2004) after the events of 9/11 – it is a feature of the
events  that  they  are  in  fact  ineffable.  This  confirms  the  link  between  the  duty  to
remember  and  the  injunction  regarding  what  cannot  be  represented.  The  exact
corollary  of  the  political  obligation  of  representation  is  its  ethical  ban.  In  modern
times, the rhetorical function of representation is directly placed in a crisis situation.
The  ethical  ban  blocks  representation  and  silences  expression,  which  today  leads
certain  authors  to  declare  that  Auschwitz –  taken as  a  metonym of  catastrophe in
modern times – has annihilated our capacity for representation. Here again, emphasis
is placed on auto-representation as the escape route, in the form of “staging of the self”
and “auto-referential discourse”. It has nevertheless been said that representation is
first and foremost the capacity to mediatise the event in question. That is also why
rhetoric, as a tool for keeping events at a distance through its symbolic function, is the
enemy of Sade’s injunction to “say everything”7. And yet… How can we use language to
mediatise  an  event  that  by  its  very  nature  is  incapable  of  being  represented?  The
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consequences for the entire rhetorical system are crucial. Without representation there
can be neither judgment nor decision. Thus Yannis Thanassekos envisages what could
indeed provide a way of resolving the aporia of representation – the art of giving an
eye-witness  account.  This  has  the  fascinating  ability  to  transcend  the  aporia  of
representation. Because in one way it  allows the mediatisation of the event and its
symbolisation through discourse, without completely placing it at a distance. The eye-
witness narrates the event by his/her real presence and corporeity; he/she is thus able
to take the risk of representing an event, personally guaranteeing the authenticity of
that representation. The enthusiasm for the eye-witness account noticeable now, at the
start of the 21st century, is perhaps due to the intuition of a society that hopes to find in
rhetoric the means of reaching beyond the aporia that appears to be caused by the duty
to remember. But the last eye-witnesses are disappearing, and it will be necessary to
find a  way of  ritualising their  words  so  that  the  guarantee of  authenticity  may be
retained beyond their actual presence. There is obviously an intellectual urgency to
this.
 
Is there a crisis of judgment?
14 Judgment is an evaluation of representation. It is essential to the rhetorical function, as
it is on the basis of its establishment that decisions are subsequently made. Thus it may
be supposed that the difficulty in making judgments is in addition to the difficulty in
representing the event in question. Marc Angenot leads the way with regard to the
contemporary figure of resentment by referring explicitly to Max Scheler (1958). In the
typology proposed by this specialist in the rhetoric of the social world, the figure of
resentment represents one of the four idealised rhetorical types in present-day society,
all involved in a “dialogue of the deaf”. The author immediately broaches the subject of
society’s stakeholders’ ability to reach common judgments through debate, a question
indeed  shared  by  the  rhetorical  models  of  normative  inspiration.  If  a  failing  in
argumentative ability is noted in the partner’s speech, this implies that, even before
the  arguments  are  discussed,  there  is  no  acknowledgement  that  the  partner  is
trustworthy. This dialogue of the deaf is a chronic revelation of the fact that many of
the participants in the debate do not seem to share a common world, or even a set of
pre-required conditions for holding the discussion. In a word, the “other person” – the
person who does not think as I  do – is  deemed intrinsically irrational,  which quite
simply  prevents  any  discussion  with  that  person.  From  the  disagreement  that  is
theoretically the origin of all possibility of discussion and argumentation, we move on
to condemnation and disqualification. On this point, Marc Angenot refers to a cognitive
break, something much deeper than disagreement, since it actually prevents discussion
taking  place.  Analysis  of  the  figure  of  resentment,  which  seems  to  be  particularly
present  these  days,  starts  out  from this  observation of  the  absence  of  real  debate.
Indeed this  form of  the “privatisation of  ethical  and civic  universals” affirms,  by a
method of reasoning which the author qualifies as specious, that “my failure is the
indication  of  my  merit”.  This  method  of  reasoning  is  intimately  linked  to  the
conspiracy turn of mind, and operates on the basis of conspiratorial thinking. This, like
the method of reasoning based on abduction inherited from the rhetoric of enclosed
worlds, has the immense advantage of being extremely effective in terms of persuasion:
gathering together a group defined by its identity, it supplies in one movement a single
cause for all  the injustices and political disasters being experienced, a cause that is
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indeed hidden, but irrefutable once it has been revealed. A normative conception of
rhetoric  would  condemn this  index-based  method of  reasoning  as  fallacious.  Being
abductive rather than inductive, it is not logically valid. It would then be necessary to
look outside the rhetorical paradigm, towards the pre-Platonic, pre-logic – in a word,
irrational – index paradigm. Even so, Marc Angenot emphasises that this method of
reasoning is particularly useful these days, because it occupies the place left empty by
the present  context  of  “crisis”  and the disintegration of  the great  promises  of  our
times. Critique itself, the mainstay of modern times, is being replaced by its archaic
corollary  of  storing  up  clues  that  reveal  the  Cause.  Seen  from this  viewpoint,  any
attempt at critique is immediately interpreted as a new manifestation of the ignominy
of the enemy. In psychological terms, it should no doubt be noted that such a practice
is much more reassuring than the practice that consists of endless discussion on the
basis of pre-required conditions – those of modernity – which appear to be at least in
part placed in crisis8. Have the moderns we are “returned” to being irrational? Or are
we discovering that we have never been rational in the way ideal rhetoric could have
thought? The question remains unanswered.
15 For his part, Philippe Breton adopts the notion of rhetorical incompetence as not only
the sign but also part of the explanation of clearly diagnosed democratic incompetence.
More  specifically,  the  author  holds  that  rhetoric  and  democracy  are  the  two
component parts of a single matrix, that of a specifically human ability taking the form
of “competence”. This would, in a way, be the functional description of the rhetorical
paradigm.  We  find  competence  at  work  in  places  of  words,  empty-centred  circles,
representing  an  axis  of  symmetry,  symbolising  equality.  Equality  has  no  meaning
unless it is actually granted in the right to speak. Expressed differently, equality – as is
liberty, which is correlative to it – cannot be acquired without learning how to speak
out.  Without such learning,  a degree of rhetorical  incompetence would lead to real
democratic incompetence. What does this competence comprise? “Rules” is Philippe
Breton’s  answer,  aware  of  the  fact  that  he  could  be  accused  of  a  certain  form  of
normativity that includes a touch of elitism, which is ultimately irreconcilable with
democracy. At any event, these rules comprising rhetorical competence should make it
possible for citizens to make judgments with a view to making decisions, not in the
capacity of experts, but in the capacity of citizens. This is evidently also a function of
democracy. Yet Philippe Breton’s observation on the current state of this competence
among citizens is not optimistic. Thus on the basis of a certain number of observations
made during experimentation9,  he draws up an inventory of  incompetence (Breton,
2006).
16 What does this observation mean? Is society in crisis because it realises the discrepancy
between its democratic ideal and its practical achievements? Or is society at an early
stage of democratic competence, such that there is reason to hope that it will evolve?
Here again, there is no conclusive answer.
 
Is there a crisis in decision-making?
17 A third type of  approach involves  thinking about  the practice  of  argumentation in
democracy, and more specifically in the deliberative function responsible for making
decisions.  Alban  Bouvier,  as  a  sociologist  specialising  in  argumentation,  asks  the
question clearly: “Is there is crisis in rhetoric or is there a crisis in democracy?” To
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answer the question, he observes the way in which democracies treat decisions, seen as
the result of argumentative deliberation. In this perspective, the author proposes a full
definition of argumentation: a technique aimed at persuasion by using rational means
including logic, but also aiming for effectiveness. The corollary of this definition is that
rhetoric is also a technique aimed at persuasion, but without a criterion of logic. We
must  therefore  see  in  every  valorisation  of  argumentation  by  a  given  society  a
movement  of  rhetorical  anti-crisis.  The  hypothesis  of  an  anti-crisis  in  rhetoric  is
supported by the analysis  of  two examples.  The first  concerns the highly valorised
notion of “deliberative” democracy. This occurs most frequently in proximity contexts
of democracy, as a reaction to a crisis in political authority, and more specifically as a
reaction to a crisis in its legitimacy. This ought to be improved by using processes for
justifying decisions made by elected representatives and, at the same time, by giving
citizens the possibility of contesting decisions. The case in question involves people
living on the sites of major regional development projects. Alban Bouvier points out
two criticisms levelled at these practices. The first, marginal but interesting in terms of
theory,  comes  from  American  feminists  who  stipulate  that  deliberation  is  not
democratic because people do not all have the same talent for oratory. However, this
turns  the  practice  of  argumentation  into  a  gift,  rather  than  a  competence  within
Philippe Breton’s meaning. If this criticism were to be intensified, we could see in it –
Alban Bouvier emphasises – a crisis in rhetoric.  Indeed this talent, given by Nature,
could not in any circumstances be equated with the systematic learning of a series of
rules. The second, more serious, criticism claims that such a practice is a masquerade,
on the basis that the decisions would in fact remain independent of the deliberations.
Claims of this kind involve policy, while presupposing the valorisation of the practice of
argumentation. In this sense, it does not reveal any crisis in rhetoric.
18 The second example is that of the revalorisation of parliamentary debate. This comes
from the  United  States,  in  the  context  of  a  political  crisis  suspected  of  promoting
clientelism to the detriment of the common good. In such a framework, Alban Bouvier
recalls  that  Jon  Elster  (1986)  explicitly  valorised  the  practice  of  argumentation  in
decision-making,  in  contrast  to  negotiation  and  voting.  Here  again  this  reveals  a
preference  for  the  rational  nature  of  deliberation,  within  Aristotle’s  meaning.  The
author concludes by providing a specific answer to the question – there is a political
crisis in which argumentation is valorised, and even used as a rhetorical anti-crisis.
19 Lastly,  Benoît Frydman considers the contestation of popular juries for assize court
hearings. This originated in a personal experience, as the law professor was involved as
a legal expert in the reform of this institution. The article therefore begins with an
account that refers to the concern and frustration experienced during the procedure.
Benoît Frydman had had the clear impression that, for the legal experts, it was a matter
of ratifying the decision that had already been made to do away with popular juries for
assize court hearings. The researcher sees in this the clear sign of a two-fold crisis, both
in rhetoric and in democracy. By way of explanation, he recalls that the popular jury
constitutes  one  of  society’s  most  radically  democratic  institutions.  However,  the
distrust  of  it  on the part  of  a  section of  society  is  at  least  partly  due to  a  certain
conception of rhetoric. From this point of view, he stresses the intimate link that exists
between an anti-democracy attitude and an anti-rhetoric attitude, as inherited from
Plato.  A  contrario,  he  proposes  a  return  to  a  culture  of  eloquence,  orality,  the
expression of emotions – in short, a culture of fully assumed, incarnated rhetoric. The
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fact remains that such an experience of contesting popular juries expresses a paradox,
since it goes against a current trend – also noted by Alban Bouvier – that consists of
promoting situations of participative democracy. One of the reasons for this paradox is
perhaps  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  legal  rhetoric  constitutes  the  democratic
institution  par  excellence  where  it  is  evident  that  the  responsibility  of  rhetoric  is
crucial.  As for any human activity,  as soon as it  appears conventional to the social
stakeholders, it manifests thereby that it is not infallible.
 
Conclusion
20 Representing,  judging and deciding are human activities  that  are necessary for  the
construction  of  social  reality,  and  they  need  the  rhetorical  function  for  their
completion.  However,  the  framework  of  rhetorical  activity  has  always  been  torn
between the question of the criteria for its rationality and the question of its actual
effectiveness.  In  a  democracy,  argumentation  supposes  the  use  by  society’s
stakeholders  of  at  least  one  of  the  functions  analysed  by  the  contributors  to  this
presentation.  Today,  rhetorical  reasoning  appears  to  be  challenged  by  its  own
functionality. Its practice reveals the chronic failings and limits of human ability to
present the world, to formulate shared judgments, and hence to make decisions for the
common good. This observation, whether or not it reveals a crisis, at any event sets the
challenge of thinking about rhetoric, more particularly from the starting point of the
failings and limits of its practice.
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NOTES
1.  The work of C. Plantin (2005) in Lyon should be considered just as much as that of J.-M. Adam
(2005) in Lausanne and R. Amossy (2005) in Tel Aviv.
2. See, for example, the work by members of the GRAL in Brussels (www.ulb.ac.be/gral).
3. We see a similar approach by D. Thouard (2007) when he seeks to achieve dialogue between
various points of  view on the “index paradigm” within the meaning adopted by C.  Ginzburg
(1986).
4. General and specialist literature currently offers many examples that allow us to think that
these  three  functions  are  deemed  to  be  in  crisis  by  a  section  of  society’s  stakeholders;  the
bibliography contains a number of examples.
5. The texts selected for this presentation on “Crises in rhetoric, crises in democracy” were first
presented and discussed at an international colloquy with the same title, held at the Université
Libre  de  Bruxelles  on 10  and 11 May 2007,  with  the  support  of  the  FNRS and the  Perelman
Foundation.
6. For contemporary thoughts on representation, see for example Goody (2006) or Bougnoux
(2007).
7.  The opposition of the “symbolic” function of mediatisation by language and the “diabolical”
reduction of immediate expression in perverse thinking has been emphasised very keenly by
F. Ost (2005). This is still a matter of rhetoric.
8. On  the  crises  of  modernity,  see  for  example  M.  Gauchet  (2000),  R.  Senett  (1981),  and
B. Williams (2006).
9.  Within the CNRS and at the request of the inspectorate-general for arts subjects at the French
Ministry of Education, Philippe Breton carried out a study which was then the subject of a report
drawn up in collaboration with B. Joerg, entitled Expérimentation du “débat argumenté” en classe de
seconde. Présentation, analyse et premiers bilans (experimentation of “argued debate” in the first
year of upper secondary school – presentation, analysis, and initial results) (June 2005). Available
at http://argumentation.blog.lemonde.fr/
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